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In a conservation auction there are many possible influences on bid prices.  This paper 
considers a range of factors that influenced the bids submitted to the Queensland 
Government’s Vegetation Incentives Program (VIP).  The relationships between total bid 
price and a variety of variables are examined.  The VIP appears to be a unique example 
of a program that asks landholders to separate management and covenant costs in their 
tender.  Forgoing payment on the covenant may be an indicator of low opportunity cost 
or altruism on the part of the landholder.  Accordingly this paper also investigates the 
influences on covenant bids. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Auction theory can be applied to the problem of funding natural resource management on 
private properties.  An adequate market for providing public goods from private land 
does not exist, which is why there is an under-provision of environmental goods and 
services.  Auctions can help form a quasi-market for environmental public goods (Latacz-
Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1998:335).  This market has several distinguishing 
characteristics, such as only having one buyer (usually the government) and many sellers 
with a wide range of opportunity costs (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 
1998:335-37).  As in standard procurement auctions, in conservation auction the bidders 
with the best tenders win the contracts.  This means that price, the ecological significance 
of the property and sometimes the management actions offered (or the ecological change 
expected) are used to choose the winning bids.  An auction encourages landholders to 
reveal their opportunity cost and the purchaser to reveal information on the best 
management actions.  This leads to better coordination of demand to protect biodiversity 
and landholders willing to supply the services.  It also provides a more cost-effective use 
of public funds.   
 
In a conservation auction there are many possible influences on bid prices.  The design of 
a conservation auction can change which participants are attracted to the program and 
influence bid values.  This aspect of the mechanism has not been widely explored using 
data from an on-ground conservation auction.  The aim of this paper is to assess the 
influences on bids submitted to the Queensland Government’s Vegetation Incentives 
Program (VIP).  A participant survey allowed data on the VIP’s participants and 
characteristics relevant to their bids to be gathered and analysed.  These characteristics 
relate to the opportunity cost of participation, information rent in the bid, opinions of the 
program and socio-economic characteristics of bidders.  The structure of the bids also 
allowed for the influences on covenant values to be tested separately.   
 
This paper is organised as follows: In the next section the VIP is described and the bid 
levels are reported.  In section 3 the possible theoretical influences on bid levels are 
briefly described.  In section 4 a series of bivariate correlations between the total bid level 
and a variety of variables are reported and an OLS regression undertaken.  In section 5 a 
similar series of bivariate correlations between the covenant bid and a range of variables 
are reported and a logistic regression undertaken.  Conclusions are drawn in the final 
section. 
 
2.  Background to the VIP 
 
The Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Water (NRW) introduced the VIP, 
with a $12 million budget, as part of a financial assistance package that accompanied 
extensive changes to the state’s vegetation management legislation in 2004.  The VIP was 
designed as a single round, sealed bid discriminatory-price auction to fund the protection 
and management of non-remnant vegetation in Queensland.  To simplify administration 
the program was run in three phases.  The program commenced in the Southern Grazing 
Lands in September 2004.  The second phase, for the rest of QLD excluding South East   3 
Queensland (SEQ), started in June 2005.  The SEQ phase started in late 2005 and 
finished in June 2006.  The results of the program are summarised in the table below. 
 
 












Date finished  July 2005  December 2005  December 2005  June 2006 
Queries 
(approx) 
76  160  90  500 
Expressions of 
interest 
21  58  26  112 
Applications  8   31  7   62 (51 
people)* 
Approved  0  14  2  22 
Average size 
property 
130  11.5  2441  130 
*Some people put in more than one tender 
Table One: Summary of the VIP 
 
Greening Australia was chosen through a tender process to deliver the VIP in each 
region.  Landholders received a site visit to help them develop a five year management 
plan, and also had to sign a permanent covenant that was attached to their land title.  A 
very restrictive covenant was designed for the use of the VIP in the first round.  This was 
a main cause of the low participation rate and high bid levels for this phase.  No tenders 
were funded as the bid prices were felt to be too high for the expected environmental 
gains.  As a result, other permanent protection options were made available in the next 
two rounds.  Most participants have chosen to use a Nature Refuge covenant, which is 
managed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  In the subsequent phases 38 
tenders were accepted.  In total, 18 880 hectares of high conservation value non remnant 
vegetation was protected across Queensland. 
 
Participants in the VIP were sent a questionnaire which asked landholders questions 
about influences on their participation and bid levels, socio-economic factors and their 
property.  There was a response rate of almost 57%.  A case number assigned to each 
landholder allowed the questionnaire data to be matched to the bidding and property data 
gathered by NRW.  Due to the high participation rate in peri-urban areas, only 58% of the 
respondents reported agricultural production on their land, with an average across all 
participants of 27% of land under agricultural production.  Participants had a positive 
environmental worldview, and were generally participating because of the chance to help 
the environment.  Most had had previous experience with government NRM programs, 
were far more educated than the average Queensland resident and had slightly higher 
income.   
 
VIP applicants were requested to submit a bid that contained a price for the five year 
management plan and a price for the covenant payment.  The covenant payment   4 
represented the opportunity cost of signing the covenant, including any option value or 
transaction costs that the landholder deemed relevant.  No financial advice was provided 
on either element of the total bid.  This system was established following advice that 
separating the two elements would simplify taxation for the landholder.  The separation 
of prices meant that information on the landholder’s valuation of the management plan 
and the covenant was available.  In the analysis in this paper bids are grouped into three 
geographical groups: Southern and Central Grazing Lands (SCGL), FNQ and SEQ. 
 
There was a wide range of total bids (made up of the management plan and covenant 
bids) both within and between regions.  The lowest bid was $40/ha (in SCGL) and the 
highest $121 306/ha (in SEQ).  These bid amounts were for all bids submitted to the VIP, 
not just the bids that were eventually successful.  The average price for the funded 
tenders was $151/ha, indicating that there may have been a high level of speculative bids. 
 
The average covenant bid per hectare was 80% of the average total bid in SCGL, 24% in 
FNQ and 23% in SEQ.  In the first round, all of the eight participants submitted a bid for 
the covenant payment.  In the second round SCGL all of the applicants again asked for a 
covenant payment.  However, in FNQ 10 of the 33 bidders did not ask for a covenant 
payment.  In round three in SEQ, only sixteen out of the fifty-one applicants (31%) 
requested a covenant payment, which was the lowest proportion of all the rounds.  The 
difference between SCGL and the other regions may reflect the greater foregone 
opportunity cost from agriculture in SCGL and the greater proportion of altruistic 
conservation-focused landholders in SEQ and FNQ.  As with the total bids, the amount of 
money requested for the covenant payments varied widely, from $15/ha (SCGL) to $56 
167/ha (SEQ).  Some landholders seemed to be asking for a token amount of money 
while others submitted complex calculations for lost income.   
 
3.  Possible influences on bid price 
 
When forming a bid a landholder must balance net payoffs and acceptance probability.  
Although a higher bid increases the net payoff it reduces the probability of winning, and 
vice versa.  Fundamentally, landholders need to base their bid on their opportunity cost of 
participation.  This can include the costs of carrying out any management as well as lost 
income from participating.  Economic theory suggest that producers have differing 
opportunity costs based on a variety of factors such as the productivity of their land, 
ownership costs, returns available from other uses of the land, expectations for their 
business’ future, and other less quantifiable factors such as the desire of the landholder to 
conserve the land (GAO 1989:36).  A first best outcome for an auction is having bids 
based solely on opportunity costs (Stoneham et al 2003:490).  This means that the 
maximum amount of environmental improvement is achieved for the money spent.   
 
However, as well as opportunity cost landholders often include information rent in their 
bids.  Generally there is information asymmetry in a conservation auction: the funder 
holds information on the significance of the properties and the most appropriate 
management actions, while the landholder holds the information on the opportunity cost 
of changing their natural resource management practices.  Latacz-Lohmann and Van der   5 
Hamsvoort (1998) describe how the hidden information of the landholder can lead also to 
the principal-agent problem of adverse-selection.  Information asymmetry can manifest 
itself in higher costs for a program through adverse selection – where those with low 
costs choose to participate and be overpaid – and through landholders misrepresenting 
their costs in an effort to be overpaid.  Basically, landholders can take advantage of 
information asymmetry and be paid above their true opportunity costs (Latacz-Lohmann 
1998).  Information rent is based on the likelihood of the bid succeeding - as the 
probability of being accepted increases, landholders increase the information rent in their 
bid, which leads to higher bids (Stoneham et al 2003:490).  Many factors contribute to 
the landholder’s perceived probability of being accepted, including the amount of 
information they hold about the relative importance of their property, the presumed range 
of bids submitted by other participants and the perceived level of competition in the 
process.  Altruism towards the goal of the program can encourage landholders to reduce 
information rent. 
 
Uncertainty may lead to participants increasing their bids.  Participants in a procurement 
auction may increase their bids to avoid underbidding. It is possible that the landholder 
may not be fully aware even of their own opportunity costs.  There is often an element of 
uncertainty about the impact of adopting some natural resource management practices.  
Landholders knowing their own costs of participation may be a reasonable assumption 
for simple physical projects or for the short term, but it is less likely to hold when 
estimating income foregone, especially in the long term.  The subsequent increase in the 
bid is known as a risk premium (Windle and Rolfe 2005). 
 
4.  Influences on bid levels in the VIP 
 
One of the major components of the bids in the VIP was the management costs associated 
with the five year management plan.  Management activities included fencing, weed 
control, pest animal control, revegetation, fire management, installation of watering 
systems and monitoring and evaluation.  The costs of different activities varied between 
regions, with fencing costing more on average in SEQ ($5264/km in FNQ and $8386/km 
in SEQ) and tree planting costing more on average in FNQ ($6/tree in FNQ and $4/tree in 
SEQ).
 2  Even within the same activities in the same region there was a wide range of 
costs.  For example revegetation bids in FNQ varied from 0.28 cents a tree to $12 a tree.  
These cost differences depended on what the landholder included in the bid (for example 
some included site preparation and on-going care) and how they proposed to undertake 
the activity.  For example, some landholders had already established their own native tree 
nursery and provided free labour while others brought in contractors for the whole work.  
As discussed later, it is also possible that some of the higher costs included information 
rent on the part of the landholder.  These differences in opportunity costs are part of what 
drive the cost savings possible in a competitive tender.  Each landholder typically had a 
wide range of activities with different levels of provision.  This meant that management 
plan costs were not comparable and so they were not statistically analysed in relation to 
bid costs.   
 
                                                 
2 These costs are taken from the management plans that matched the questionnaire sample.   6 
A wide range of other variables were statistically analysed in relation to bidding in the 
VIP.  These variables are described in Table Four, along with the level of the variable and 
its name for the analysis. 
 
Variable  Type
3  Coding 
VIP project area  Interval. 
Transformed 
Project size 
Property size  Interval –
transformed 
Property size 




Total bid $ 
Covenant bid  Interval –
transformed 
Covenant bid $ 
Requested a covenant payment  Dummy  Covenant 
Environmental importance 
score 
Normal interval  Score 
Length of residency in the area  Normal interval  Length residency 
New Ecological Paradigm score   Normal interval  NEP 
Age of respondent in years  Normal interval  Age 
Income  Non-normal 
interval 
Income 





Presence of agricultural 
production on the property 
Dummy  Any agriculture 
Greater than 60% of income 
from off-farm sources 
Dummy  High off-farm income 
Belief that bidding will be 
competitive 
Dummy  Competitive 
Belief that bid likely to succeed  Dummy  Likely to succeed 
Believe that covenant will 
decreased land value 
Dummy  Land value 
Belief in relative importance of 
their vegetation 
Dummy  Vegetation importance 
Want to keep their property in 
the family 
Dummy  Family 
Bachelor degree or higher  Dummy  Higher education 
≥3 business activities or ≤80% 
less of their farm business in 
one activity 
Dummy  Diverse agriculture 
In an agricultural industry that 
is more likely to face 
opportunity cost from the 
covenant (all industries bar 
Dummy  Opportunity cost 
                                                 
3 All transformed variables used a natural log function.   7 
tourism, water supply and 
education) 
A third party helped form the 
management plan 
Dummy  Consultant 
Understand the selection 
process 
Dummy  Understand 
Participate as like to set own 
price on work 
Dummy  Own price 
Participate as extra paid work 
will be useful to family 
Dummy  Want paid work 
Table Two: Variables tested 
 
The bivariate correlations of independent variables with the total bid amount were 
calculated to test relationship strength.  These correlations are reported in Table Five.
4  
Only statistically significant relationships are reported. 
 
Variable  One tailed test  Correlation with 
total bid $ (r)  
Correlation with 
total bid (τ) 
Project size       0.573***   
Property size      0.593***   
Any agriculture        0.228** 
Off-farm income        -0.226** 
Age    -0.503***   
Likely to succeed        -0.271** 
Understand process        -0.211** 
Diverse agriculture      0.285* 
Own price        0.219** 
Want paid work        0.186* 
*=0.1 **=0.05 ***=0.01 
Table Three: Correlation with transformed total bid variable ($). 
 
Predictably, project size was strongly correlated with the total bid amount r=0.573, 
p≤0.001.  It was hypothesised that properties with large areas would be more able to 
afford participation in the VIP as they could better afford to give up some land.  They are 
also more likely to have parts of the property that are lower quality for production, and 
thus have a lower opportunity cost of participation.  However, landholders with larger 
properties were more likely to submit a higher bid r=0.593, p≤0.001.  This could be due 
to the strong link between property size and project size (r=0.861, p≤ 0.001), however 
even when project size is controlled in a partial correlation, there is still a small 
correlation between property size and the total bid r=0.219, p≤0.1 one-tail.  This could be 
due to the larger property owners being more dependent on income from their properties, 
with a strong negative correlation existing between off-income and property size r= -
0.514, p≤.001. 
                                                 
4 Pearson’s r is used for interval level data and nonparametric correlation measure of Kendall’s tau-B (τ) is 
used for the dichotomous variables.   8 
 
Landholders who were reliant upon their property for income were more likely to submit 
higher bids, as reflected by the negative relationship between high off-farm income and a 
lower bid level, r=-0.299, p≤0.05 one tail.  Similarly having any agriculture was 
positively associated with a higher bid level, τ =0.228, p≤0.05 one tail.  The correlation 
between the diverse agriculture variable and the bid level is a reflection of the impact of 
dependence on a business activity.  The results show a moderate positive correlation 
between diverseness of agriculture and the bid level τ =0.285 p≤0.1.  Although 
diversification of income is typically seen as reducing risk to income, it is possible these 
landholders felt financially less stable and this is revealed in their bid.  Alternatively, the 
landholders may have seen the VIP as a source of income diversification. 
 
Another form of opportunity cost is a decrease in land value due to the permanent 
covenant.  Just over half of the VIP participants believed that a covenant will have a 
negative impact on their property value, with 30% believing that the value will decrease 
slightly and another 22% believing it will decrease significantly.  Only 11% believed a 
covenant will increase their property value, with the rest of participants reporting that 
they were unsure or that the covenant would probably have no impact on value.  Despite 
this widespread concern over the impact on land value, total bid levels were not 
significantly associated with a belief that land values will fall after signing a covenant τ = 
0.085, ns.   
 
Three items in the participant’s questionnaire attempted to assess possible influences on 
information rent by bidders.  These asked about the perceived level of competition in the 
region, the perceived quality of the bidder’s vegetation compared to the region and the 
perceived likelihood of being accepted.  Forty-two percent of respondents believed that 
bidding would be fairly competitive, and another 20% believed it would be very 
competitive.  It was expected that a belief in competitiveness would lead to landholders 
decreasing their bids in an effort to maximise the chances of their bids being accepted.  
No respondents thought their vegetation was less environmentally important than other 
patches in their region, which is not surprising as it would seem unlikely for a landholder 
who believed this to participate in a competitive tender.  Sixty-two percent believed their 
bush was of greater importance.  It was anticipated that this would increase a bid level as 
participants would believe they could charge a premium and so increase the information 
rent in a bid.  Nearly all respondents were confident that their bid would be accepted, 
with 68% saying that they thought it was likely and 16% that it was very likely.  As with 
the previous factor, this is predicted to increase the bid level.  The $12 million budget 
was widely advertised and discussed, which might have led to landholders believing large 
bids would be acceptable. 
 
However in practice these questionnaire items are not particularly revealing of the 
information rent in a bid.  Landholders who believed that their bid was likely to be 
accepted were more likely to have lower bids τ =-0.271, p≤0.05 one tail.  This is contrary 
to the predicted direction.  It is possible that participants who had low bids consequently 
thought they were likely to be accepted.  The relationship between the bid price and the 
landholder’s opinion of their vegetation was not statistically significant, r=0.006, ns.    9 
Similarly, it does not appear likely that VIP participants conditioned their bids on their 
ecological benefits score.  There was no significant link between scores and bid levels r= 
-0.190, ns.  The relationship between bid levels and the belief of the competitiveness of 
bidding was also statistically non-significant τ =-0.008, ns.  This might have also been 
due to the belief of landholders that they were submitting good bids and management 
plans so did not change their bids based on their perception of competitiveness.  The 
recent Fitzroy Basin Association Biodiversity Tender survey found that successful 
landholders were less concerned about the competitiveness of their bids (Windle and 
Rolfe 2006:9). 
 
There are a variety of reasons why information rent was not detectable in the VIP bids.  
The first is that the questionnaire sample was too small.  Bid construction may have been 
rushed or confused due to the newness of the mechanism and the uncertainty surrounding 
the program’s development.  Finally, there may not have been much information rent.  
Competition may have reduced the scope for information rent or landholders may have 
been very altruistic. 
 
Having a positive environmental attitude probably reduces the information rent in a 
participant’s bid.  The modified New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) scale for the participant 
responses was not internally consistent and lacked predictive capacity, including with the 
bid level r=0.032, ns.  This was possibly due to a lack of unidemsionality and a 
homogenous group of participant responses.  Widegren (1998) discovered that 
willingness to pay for environmentally friendly food was not correlated with NEP, and 
postulated that the high level of agreement amongst Swedes with the NEP questions may 
have resulted in a weak predictive capacity.  There may have been a similar problem with 
the VIP participants. 
 
There was widespread uncertainty amongst landholders over forming a bid amount, 
particularly for the covenant.  Field officers did not offer advice to landholders on the 
formation of bids.  Greening Australia field staff reported that many landholders 
expressed concern over forming a bid without explicit guidelines.  One participant 
commented on their questionnaire that the “Bidding process needs some parameters to 
ensure bids are not a waste of time. i.e.: there would be massive differences in bid 
amounts”.  This may have resulted in landholders asking for a “risk premium”.  Not 
surprisingly, those who understand the selection process are likely to put in lower bids 
τ=-0.211, p≤0.05 one tail.  There is likely to be less of a risk premium included in a bid if 
a landholder feels confident about the program. 
 
The only socio-demographic variable that had a statistically significant relationship with 
the bid level was age, with older participants being more likely to put in low bids.  This 
was an unexpected result as there was no prior reason to hypothesize either way about the 
influence of age.  Two of the reasons associated with the utility of income for 
participating – “I like being able to set my own price on the work” and “The extra paid 
work will be useful for family members” – are weakly associated with bid levels at τ=-
0.219, p≤0.1 one tail and τ =0.186, p≤0.1 one tail, respectively.  It is not surprising that 
landholders who participated for these reasons had higher bids, as these landholders   10 
probably value their work highly and are less willing to let an opportunity to make extra 
income pass them by.   
 
OLS regression analysis 
 
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was undertaken to test if bid levels can be 
influenced by a combination of different variables.  A model was created from the 
variables described in the preceding sections.  The explanatory variables included 
variables representing the costs of participation, bid characteristics, and property, 
respondent and contract characteristics.  Despite the problems with the score variable, it 
is included here as it strongly increases the explanatory power of the model.  Casewise 
diagnostics were undertaken and it became apparent that one case was an outlier.  When 
this case was removed, the model’s explanatory power increased.  The data fitted the 
model F(9)=10.369 p≤0.001.  The adjusted R
2 was 0.682, indicating that 68.2% of the 
variance in the total bid was explained by the model.  The resulting regression output is 
shown in Table Six.   
 
Variable  β  SE  Beta  Significance 
Constant  9.609  .689    .000 
Project size***  .365  .077  .529  .000 
Any agriculture*  .507  .277  .229  .079 
High off-farm 
income**  -.660  .259  -.304  .017 
Competitive  .350  .238  .161  .153 
Length 
residency***  -.033  .010  -.450  .002 
Want paid work***  .831  .265  .320  .004 
Score  .010  .023  .047  .658 
Covenant**  .554  .231  .257  .023 
Note. Adjusted R
2, 0.682. Standard error estimate 0.61724. F=10.369 (p≤0.001). 
*=0.1 **=0.05 ***=0.01 
Table Four: OLS regression 
 
The dependent variable is the bid amount, transformed by a natural log function to 
normalise its distribution.  Of the nine independent variables, six were statistically 
significant.  Because of the log transformation of the bid level, to interpret the substantive 
impact of the relationships with the independent variables the regression coefficients 
have to be exponentiated. 
 
The opportunity cost variables were significant, and in the expected direction.  A one unit 
increase in property size resulted in a 44% increase in bid prices.  Bid levels of 
landholders with high off-farm income (over 60%) were approximately 52% lower than 
other landholders.  Those with agricultural production had 66% higher bid levels.  
Including a covenant bid increased the total bid by 74%.  The variable with the largest 
impact on bid size was a landholder’s decision to participate based on wanting more paid 
work for family members, increasing bid levels by 130%.  This is unexpectedly large.    11 
An extra year of residency in an area meant that bid levels were likely to have 3% lower 
bids.  This provides support for the notion that longer residency leads to a greater support 
for conservation.  Alternatively, residents that have lived in an area might have lower 
opportunity costs due to a more established farm business or being aware of less 
expensive ways to carry out the management plan. 
 
The unexplained variance in the model was likely due to the costs of implementing the 
management plan, which were unable to be captured.  In addition the model did not 
explicitly capture any risk premium that a landholder included due to uncertainty over the 
new process and any unmeasured information rent. 
 
5.  Influence on covenant level 
 
The requirement for a permanent covenant increased the cost of the program, as was 
revealed by the high proportion of costs attributed to the covenant in the VIP, as 
discussed in Section Two.  The bivariate correlations between the amount of money 
requested for the covenant and a range of other variables were calculated to test what 
influenced covenant bids alone as opposed to total bid prices.
5  The results of significant 
correlations are reported in Table Seven.   
 
Variable  One tailed test  Correlation with 
covenant bid $ (τ)  
Project size      0.232** 
Property size      0.297*** 
Proportion 
agriculture 
    0.413*** 
Opportunity cost      0.378*** 
Income      -0.388*** 
High off-farm      -0.418*** 
Decrease land value      0.282** 
Believe bid likely to 
succeed 
    -0.316*** 
Higher education    -0.291** 
Family    0.279** 
Table Five: Kendall’s tau correlation with covenant bid ($) 
*=0.1 **=0.05 ***=0.01 
 
These results show support for the idea that landholders with high opportunity cost 
submitted higher covenant bids.  As the proportion of agriculture on a property increased 
the covenant bid also increased, with a positive relationship between the two τ= 0.413, p≤ 
0.001.  Properties with a higher opportunity cost because of having agricultural 
production and being in an industry that might not be able to co-exist with the VIP (all 
agricultural industries bar tourism, water supply and education) were coded as 
                                                 
5 As the distribution of the covenant bids was not normal, even when transformed, the nonparametric 
correlation measure of Kendall’s tau-B (τ) is used.     12 
“opportunity cost” in the analysis.  There is a positive relationship between being in an 
agricultural industry that faces opportunity cost and submitting a covenant bid τ= 0.378, 
p≤ 0.01.  Respondents with sixty percent or more of their income from off-farm sources 
were more likely to submit lower covenant bids, with a strong relationship between the 
two variables τ= -0.418, p≤ 0.01.  Landholders with a higher average family income were 
also less likely to submit high bids τ= -0.388, p≤ 0.01, perhaps because they did not 
require the additional income as much as other participants. 
 
There was moderate positive link between increasing covenant bids and believing in the 
negative impact on land value τ= 0.282 p≤0.05.  This supports the idea that participants 
who fear a fall in their property value are taking the opportunity to be compensated for 
any future loss in value through the covenant payment. 
 
Landholders with higher education levels submitted lower bids τ= -0.291, p≤ 0.05.  This 
supports the commonly held idea that more educated landholders are willing to 
participate in conservation.  There is a positive relationship between wanting to keep a 
property in the family and submitting a covenant bid τ= 0.279, p≤ 0.05.  This suggests 
that participants with families may wish for a financial payment to help offset any 
negative impacts their decision to place a covenant on their vegetation would have on 
their children. 
 
The environmental attitude variable was not significantly associated with asking for a 
covenant bid, t(47)=0.734, ns, r=.107.  This does not lend support to the idea that altruism 
was a reason for the lack of a covenant bid, but could also be cause by the weak NEP 
scale for participants. 
 
Unsurprisingly, project size was positively correlated with the covenant cost τ= 0.232, p≤ 
0.01, indicating that the opportunity cost of a covenant increased as the size of land set 
aside increased.  As with the total bid analysis, landholders with larger properties were 
more likely to submit a larger covenant bid τ= 0.297, p≤ 0.01.  When project size is 
controlled in a partial correlation there is a stronger correlation between property size and 
covenant bid τ= 0.461, p≤ 0.01. 
 
The perceived likelihood of participation was negatively correlated with the covenant 
amount  - the more a person thought their bid would succeed the more likely it was that 
their bid price would fall τ= -0.316, p ≤ 0.01.  This certainty may be a result of not asking 
for a covenant price, rather than the belief in the success leading to a higher bid.  The 
other two questions associated with information rent (opinion of level of competition in 
region and importance of vegetation) were not significantly associated with the covenant 
bid. 
 
Logistic regression analysis 
 
A logistic regression with “asking for a covenant payment” as a dichotomous dependent 
variable was constructed.  This examines the multivariate relationships between selected 
independent variables and landholder’s requesting a covenant payment.  Independent   13 
variables were taken from the list of statistically significant variables in the bivariate 
correlations described in Table Seven.  There were indications of multicollinearity 
leading to the opportunity cost and off farm income dummy variables being removed.  
Predictors with weak strength were also removed as a smaller sample size benefits from a 
smaller variable to case ratio.  In the end, only three dichotomous variables were included 
in addition to the constant.  These were: having any agriculture on the property, a belief 
that land value would fall with a covenant and having a bachelor degree or higher.   
 
The results of the logistic regression are presented in Table Eight.  The recommended 
sample size is probably too small for the logit model, as a minimum sample size is 100 or 
50 cases plus a variable number that is a function of the number of predictors (Peng et al 
2002).  This probably explains the lack of statistical significance of many of the variables 
that were initially included.  The large confidence intervals (reported in the 95% CI 
column) could also be the result of the small number of cases.   
 
The data fitted the model as indicated by the statistical significance of the -2 log 
likelihood statistic and its associated chi-square statistic, χ
2 (3) = 19.917, p≤0.001.  
Between 35.1% and 47% of the variance of the covenant bid behavior was explained by 
the model according to the Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke R
2 statistics accordingly.  The 
model correctly predicts 71.4% of the outcomes of the cases compared with 54.3% in the 
benchmark model, which is a strong improvement.  No outliers were detected  
 
Variable  B  SE  Significance  Exp(B)  95% CI 
Any 
agriculture 
2.539  0.855  0.003  12.671  2.370-67.741 
Higher 
education 
-1.529  0.774  0.048  0.217  0.048-0.987 
Decrease land 
value 
1.273  0.778  0.102  3.571  0.777-16.416 
Constant  -1.790  0.895  0.045  0.167   
  -2 log likelihood = 43.504 
Table Six: Results of logistic regression 
 
Only two variables, higher education and any agriculture, were statistically significant at 
the 95% level.  The belief that a covenant would lead to a decrease in land value was 
almost significant at a 90% level.  The positive and negative signs on the coefficients 
indicate if a landholder was likely to ask for a covenant bid or not, and the Exp(B) figures 
indicate the odds of a unit increase in the independent variables having an impact on the 
dependent variable.  In this model, having agriculture on a property increases the odds of 
a participant asking for a covenant payment by a factor of 12.671, with an extremely 
large 95% confidence interval (CI) of 2.370-67.741.  Believing that a covenant is likely 
to have a negative impact on property values increases the odds of asking for a covenant 
payment by a factor of 3.571.  Alternatively, having a bachelor or postgraduate degree 
decreases the odds of asking for a payment by a factor of 0.217. 
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6.  Conclusion 
 
There was a wide range of bids submitted to the VIP.  Analysis of the questionnaire 
responses and the tenders reveals that there was a wide range of factors that lay behind 
the differing bids.  Facets of opportunity cost were the most likely to impact bid prices.  
This included both incurred costs in the management plan and opportunity costs such as 
the presence of agricultural production on a property.  The variables relating to 
information rent were difficult to interpret, indicating that the items used to measure it 
were inadequate.  It does not appear likely that landholders conditioned their bids on their 
environmental scores, however, and landholders with higher environmental quality may 
have submitted lower bids.  The wide discrepancy between the average submitted bid and 
the average funded bid could indicate that there was information rent of some kind in the 
bids but this was not adequately measured.  Length of residency also decreased the total 
bid amount.  Participation in the program to generate paid work for family members, not 
surprisingly, increased bids.  Age was strongly and negatively correlated with total bid 
levels, although it was insignificant in the regression analysis.  Attitudes towards the 
environment are likely to be important to the bid level decision but they are difficult to 
measure and are not quantified here.  Analysis from the participant survey data suggested 
that the VIP participants were altruistic and it is likely this influenced the bids, especially 
for the large number of bids that asked for nothing for the covenant payment. 
 
Examining the covenant bids alone yielded additional interesting information.  
Landholders were more likely to ask for covenant bids when they thought their land value 
would fall and when they had agricultural production on their properties, and less likely 
to ask for a covenant payment when they were highly educated.  Higher covenant bids 
were associated with the same agricultural opportunity cost factors as the total bid as well 
as wanting to keep a property in the family, having a higher education, thinking the land 
value will decrease with a covenant and being in a high opportunity cost industry.  This 
suggests that if a covenant is to be paid for, participants should be informed if there is 
unlikely to be an impact on property value or potential for agricultural production, as this 
may lead to a lower bid.  Lower covenant bids were associated with a higher income, 
high off-farm income and higher education.  This suggests that a program that does not 
pay for covenants is more likely to attract this type of landholder rather than a “typical” 
farmer.  The variables associated with the covenant bids more accurately reflect the 
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